LINGUISTIC INSTRUMENTALISM AND BILINGUALISM IN SINGAPORE: RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION

Lionel Wee
National University of Singapore

1. Introduction

A key issue in studies of globalization – taken as a series of technological and social changes leading towards greater interdependence among economies, higher integration of financial markets, and increased mobility of both capital investments as well as workers – concerns the relevance and autonomy of the state. As processes of globalization gain momentum, it’s been suggested that the main players are in fact transnational networks involving social movements, non-governmental organizations, or multinational corporations. On this view, the power and authority traditionally attributed to the state has waned so that aside from the provision of infrastructure and public goods, there is little else that it can do (Higgott et al., 2000). Of course, such a sweeping approach that simply dismisses the relevance of the state needs to be approached with caution. A more nuanced analysis requires looking at how the state responds to perceived challenges from the global system. And in this connection, it is pertinent to study changes in language policies, especially where these are motivated precisely by attempts on the part of the state to anticipate and respond to the effects of globalization.

A particularly important effect of globalization is the compression of space and time (Harvey, 1989; Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1992). Giddens (1990) in particular identifies distanciation and disembedding as two processes by which this compression...
takes place. Distanciation refers to “the conditions under which time and space are organised so as to connect presence and absence” (1990: 14), “fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction” (1990: 18) so that “place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric: that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them” (1990: 19, italics in original). Disembedding is concerned with the ways in which social relations are freed “from the restraints of local habits and practices” (1990: 20), and “lifted out” of “local contexts of interaction” and restructured “across indefinite spans of time-space” (1990: 21).

In the case of language policies, we would expect both distanciation and disembedding to result in policies that are increasingly concerned with ensuring the usefulness of language over a multitude of contexts, and as a consequence, language that is highly emblematic of, or restricted to, specifically local contexts is seen as having little global import. This is not to say that state policies can have no place for languages with little or no global relevance; a language can be ‘cocooned’ from the effects of globalization if a state chooses to treat it as having a symbolic value for a local community in allowing its speakers to retain a degree of connection with traditional values and ancient cultural heritage. But as we will see below, to do this, in the context of globalization, is to damn the language with faint praise –the language loses out in status when compared with its more economically useful counterparts, and may even lose its speakers, as, over time, they shift to other languages that are perceived to provide greater socio-economic advantages (Gal, 1979; Dorian, 1982; Edwards, 1985).

In Singapore, concerns over the impact of globalization are particularly acute given that the state has always been committed to an ideology that emphasizes the economic over all else. As Chua (1995: 59), in a discussion of the “origins of PAP4 pragmatism”, puts it thus:

The result was, and continues to be, an ideology that embodies a vigorous economic development orientation that emphasizes science and technology and

---

4 The PAP (People’s Action Party) has been Singapore’s only ruling political party since independence in 1965. It has consistently prided itself on its ‘pragmatic’ approach to governance, claiming that it is just such an attitude of pragmatism that has allowed it to effectively deal with the various problems confronted by the nation.
centralized rational public administration as the fundamental basis for industrialization within a capitalist system, financed largely by multinational capital [...].

The economic is privileged over the cultural because economic growth is seen as the best guarantee of social and political stability necessary for the survival of the nation… It continues to argue that continuous economic growth is the wellspring of all else in a Singaporean’s life, including a democratic society in the end. Thus all aspects of social life are to be instrumentally harnessed to this relentless pursuit. This ‘instrumental rationality’, to the exclusion of all other reasonable arguments, is the conceptual kernel of the PAP’s political pragmatism [...]. (Chua, 1995: 59)

A consequence of the intersection of this economic pragmatism with mounting concerns over globalization is to exacerbate an already deeply instrumentalist perspective, and in this paper, I focus on the implications of this intersection for the state’s policy of bilingualism, dealing particularly with the case of English-Mandarin bilingualism⁵, and argue that the primary effect is a shift towards linguistic instrumentalism (Rappa & Wee, 2002; Wee, 2002). Linguistic instrumentalism is a view of language that justifies its existence in a community in terms of its usefulness in achieving specific utilitarian goals such as access to economic development or social mobility⁶. In contrast, a language is viewed non-instrumentally to the extent that it is seen as forming an integral part of one’s ethnic or cultural identity, and if its existence in a community is justified in terms of its symbolic value in allowing the community members to maintain a sense of identity. Obviously there is no reason why one and the same language cannot be seen to serve both instrumentalist and symbolic functions. But as we will see, in Singapore at least, such a situation is highly unstable; the state’s attempts to respond to the challenges of globalization leads it to emphasize the instrumentalist values of both English and Mandarin. But such a response faces at least two problems. In the case of English, the state’s attempt to treat English purely in instrumentalist terms conflicts with attempts on the part of some Singaporeans to treat a local variety of English, Singlish, as a marker of a national identity. In the case of

---

⁵ Because Singapore’s language policy recognizes three official mother tongues (Mandarin, Malay and Tamil), we can also ask what happens in the cases of English-Malay and English-Tamil bilingualism. But as Wee (2002) shows, much of the discourse surrounding linguistic instrumentalism in Singapore begins with Mandarin, and is then extended, where possible, to the other mother tongues. As such, it is prudent in this paper to focus primarily on English-Mandarin bilingualism if we want a sense of the trajectory of Singapore’s bilingual policy.

⁶ The notion of linguistic instrumentalism invites comparison with Gardner & Lambert’s (1972) distinction between instrumental and integrative motivations for second-language learning. However, a significant difference lies in the fact that for Gardner and Lambert, both instrumental and integrative motivations are orientated towards an ‘other cultural community’ (1972: 3) whereas linguistic
Mandarin, the state’s desire that the language be accorded an instrumentalist value does not always sit comfortably with its own earlier attempt to get Chinese Singaporeans to see it as a marker of ethnic identity (see also Wee, 2002). To bring out these different tensions, it is useful to approach the data in terms of ‘competing discourses’\(^7\), where the discourses surrounding particular languages (such as English, Singlish, Mandarin) can be individually examined, and then brought together, thus allowing us to appreciate the kinds of problems that arise as the state attempts to reconcile the demands of globalization with pressures that are more local in orientation.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief description of Singapore’s bilingual language policy, drawing attention to the complementary relationship between the English language on one hand, and the official ‘mother tongues’ on the other. Here, we see that the discourse surrounding English treats it as having global economic import. In contrast, the mother tongues, including Mandarin, are expected to act as cultural anchors that provide their speakers with links to traditional values. Section 3 shows how the state consistently views English in instrumentalist terms, so that the development of a localized variety (Singlish), despite its potential to act as a symbol of national identity, is denigrated as a threat to Singapore’s global competitiveness. Section 4 discusses the converse, where Mandarin, the official mother tongue for the Chinese community, while originally presented by the state as a repository of traditional values, has come to be constructed, also by the state, in instrumentalist terms, particularly in the light of China’s economic development. The upshot, elaborated on in section 5, is that instead of marking ethnic affiliation, English-Mandarin bilingualism is increasingly a marker of socio-economic status and mobility. Section 6 concludes by suggesting that the Singapore situation is not unique; rather, it denotes a more general predicament faced by language planners in the context of globalization.

\(^7\) I thank Christopher Stroud for this suggestion.

instrumentalism, as conceived here, contrasts with a more symbolic view of language which treats it as a marker of one’s own identity.
2. English and the ‘mother tongues’

Singapore’s language policy recognizes four official languages: English, Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil. Of these, only English is ‘ethnically neutral’ in that it is not officially affiliated with any particular ethnic group. In contrast, the other three languages are the official mother tongues of the three major ethnic communities: Mandarin for the Chinese, Malay for the Malays, and Tamil for the Indians. Singapore’s bilingual policy has often been described as one of English-knowing bilingualism (Pakir, 1992), where each individual is expected to learn English and his/her official mother tongue. The rationale for this involves a form of linguistic division of labor, where English as the language of meritocracy, supposedly allows individuals to compete for social and economic gains while the mother tongues, as repositories of ancient traditions, help individuals to retain their sense of identity and values. This policy draws attention to the global value of English while restricting the mother tongues to what one observer (see below) describes as a “conservative function”. Consider, for example, the remarks made by Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime Minister of Singapore and currently Senior Minister (The Mirror, 20 November 1972):

When I speak of bilingualism, I do not mean just the facility of speaking two languages. It is more basic than that, first we understand ourselves … then the facility of the English language gives us access to the science and technology of the West. It also provides a convenient common ground on which… everybody competes in a neutral medium.

With the language [mother tongue] go the fables and proverbs. It is the learning of a whole value system, a whole philosophy of life, that can maintain the fabric of our society intact, in spite of exposure to all the current madnesses around the world.

Thus, Clammer (1981: 233) quotes a proponent of the bilingual policy as saying:

Bilingualism will serve to inoculate our young people against the epidemic of unwholesome fads and fetishes and make them understand that they are they, and we are ourselves.

Without such “inoculation”, a person would lack the set of traditional values that provides him/her with a sense of identity. And because only the mother tongue can provide the necessary inoculation, however proficient one might be in English, it can never adequately serve as a mother tongue. Thus, Lee Kuan Yew has stated (The Mirror, 4 September 1978):

A person who gets deculturalized –and I nearly was, so I know this danger– loses his self-confidence. He suffers from a sense of deprivation. For optimum performance a man must know himself and the world. He must know where he stands. I may speak the English language better than the Chinese language because I learnt
English early in life. But I will never be an Englishman in a thousand generations and I have not got the Western value system inside; mine is an Eastern value system. Nevertheless I use Western concepts, Western words because I understand them. But I also have a different system in my mind.

As Lee’s remarks make clear, whatever the level of English language proficiency (I may speak the English language better than the Chinese language) and however much it may have been a part of one’s early language acquisition (I learnt English early in life), there is presumed to be an essentialized relationship between language and identity (I will never be an Englishman) so that if one is ethnically a Chinese, then one’s mother tongue can never be English, regardless of one’s actual language experiences.

3. Singlish as a threat

In recent years, the state has begun expressing concerns over what it sees as the increasing popularity of a local variety of English, commonly referred to as Singlish. In terms of its linguistic properties, Singlish differs from more standard varieties in having limited inflectional morphology, making use of reduplication as a productive morphological process, and possessing a number of lexical items that originate from Malay or Hokkien (Foley et al., 1998; Wee, in preparation).

While there are claims by some Singaporeans that English should be considered a mother tongue (Wee, forthcoming), Singlish is not generally seen as a marker of a particular ethnic identity; rather it is more widely considered by some Singaporeans to be a marker of a national Singaporean identity. But this is also viewed by the state as a cause for concern, leading it to initiate the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) in 2000. According to the chairman of SGEM, Col. David Wong (The Straits Times, 31 March 2000):

We are trying to build a sense of pride, that as Singaporeans, we can speak good English as opposed to pride that we can speak Singlish. We are trying to check a trend in which younger Singaporeans are beginning to feel that it is perhaps a way of identifying themselves as Singaporeans if they speak Singlish.

But in an article supporting the use of Singlish, Hwee Hwee Tan (Time, July 29 2002) points out:

Singlish is crude precisely because it’s rooted in Singapore’s unglamorous past. This is a nation built from the sweat of uncultured immigrants who arrived 100 years ago to bust their asses in the boisterous port. Our language grew out of the hardships of
these ancestors. And Singlish is a key ingredient in the unique melting pot that is Singapore. This is a city where skyscraping banks tower over junk boats; a city where vendors hawk steaming pig intestines next to bistros that serve haute cuisine. The SGEM’s brand of good English is as bland as boiled potatoes. If the government has its way, Singapore will become a dish devoid of flavour.

These different views on Singlish arise because even though it is embraced by some Singaporeans, it is being actively discouraged by the state which sees its existence as being at odds with an economically more valuable standard variety. Thus, Lee Kuan Yew has described Singlish as “a handicap we do not wish on Singaporeans” (The Straits Times, 15 August 1999). Similarly the current Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, (1999 National Day Rally Speech) has asserted that

> We cannot be a first-world economy or go global with Singlish… The fact that we use English gives us a big advantage over our competitors. If we carry on using Singlish, the logical final outcome is that we, too, will develop our own type of pidgin English, spoken only by 3m Singaporeans, which the rest of the world will find quaint but incomprehensible. We are already half way there. Do we want to go all the way?

Thus, because the existence of Singlish is seen to undermine the proficiency of Singaporeans in standard English, the state views it as a threat to Singapore’s economic competitiveness, and whatever merits it may have as a marker of a Singaporean identity must be jettisoned in favor of the global economic value associated with the standard variety.

4. Mandarin: Towards linguistic instrumentalism

Recall that the policy of English-knowing bilingualism positions Mandarin in a complementary relationship to English; Mandarin provides the link to cultural traditions while English is the language of socio-economic mobility. This tendency to present only English in instrumentalist terms, as having economic value, has been regretted by Chew (1976: 153), who points out that Mandarin consequently suffers a loss of status by being relegated to a “conservative function”:

> In order to promote the study of Chinese [i.e. Mandarin: LW] there is lately a deliberate and in the writer’s opinion, unfortunate move to advertise the language as possessing a conservative function. When taught in schools it is designed to broadcast something known as “traditional values” which will counteract the wayward individualistic drives of the economic principle… Vague and meaningless as the phrase “traditional values” is, it must be obvious that as long as English features as the “language of commerce, science and technology” and as long as Singaporeans see “survival” in terms of economic success and education as equipping them for jobs solely, then English will always have an edge over Chinese.
The relegation of Mandarin to a primarily symbolic function cushions it from expectations that it should have any kind of relevance in the global economy, but the result of this is to create a sense of insecurity about the status of the language, particularly in relation to English. This insecurity is not groundless since it’s been noted that no student has opted to study his/her mother tongue at a higher level than the English language even though this is allowed by Singapore’s education system. As noted by the Education Minister Teo Chee Hean “Given a choice today, parents opt to put their students in the English stream and to study as much English as possible” (*The Straits Times*, 22 January 1999).

This realization led the state to refine its policies on Chinese language education along a number of lines, announced by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (*The Straits Times*, 21 January 1999). The first was to recognize that the “conservative function” was indeed doing the status of Mandarin more harm than good:

 [...] globalisation and the knowledge economy are putting a premium on internationally mobile talent… This makes it more critical to develop among them a sense of Singaporean identity and belonging through learning the mother tongue. But it also means being more careful to make realistic demands on pupils learning CL [Chinese Language: LW], so that parents do not associate a Singaporean education with burdensome CL requirements [...].

The second was to balance this conservative function by highlighting the present-day relevance of the Chinese language:

But we have to be mindful to maintain a balance between including more cultural material, and helping students to master the basics of the language… We also cannot make the contents so dense with cultural messages and historical facts that pupils cease to relate to them. We must teach Chinese as a living language to be used in our daily lives, and not something from the past that is no longer relevant to the present.

The third refinement was to be clear about the nature of this relevance to “daily lives”. Significantly, this involved a shift towards linguistic instrumentalism, by emphasizing the economic value of Mandarin:

China will be a major global player in the 21st century. A command of CL will be a valuable asset for many jobs and careers, even if the person does not live or work in China. This is true of the public service, and will be so in the private sector also. Singaporeans brought up to be bilingual will be at a significant advantage. This gives a practical purpose to learning CL, and will motivate pupils to master the language.

And finally, the fourth was to fine-tune the education system so as to groom a Chinese elite, to produce
[...] a core group of Singaporeans who are steeped in the Chinese cultural heritage, history, literature and the arts. We need them to be Chinese language teachers, writers, journalists, community leaders, MPs and Ministers [...].

It is this elite that is expected to “achieve a deeper understanding of Chinese culture” while for the majority, there will be more “realistic standards”. These realistic standards mean that for the majority, Mandarin will effectively be a working language rather than one that provides access to ancient cultural knowledge or traditions:

In our schools, English is the main medium of instruction, and must be learnt at the first language level. For the mother tongue, we want pupils who can to also do it at the first language level, or close to it. For the rest of the pupils, mother tongue instruction will have to be at second language level. What this second language level consists of is an empirical question, not a matter of opinion or dogma. It is what pupils of average ability can achieve with a reasonable effort.

Thus, according to the Ministry of Education, for the elite, the present emphasis on all four skills of reading, writing, speaking and listening, will be maintained and textbooks will be re-written to incorporate more “cultural content”. For the rest, however, the emphasis will be on listening and speaking skills with textbooks re-written to “lower their level of difficulty” (The Straits Times, 21 January 1999).

This review of Chinese language education was presented in 1999, and it would appear that, as part of its response to ensuring global competitiveness, the state has decide that the original goal of Mandarin as an anchor to an ancient cultural heritage is now restricted only to an elite –for the majority, Mandarin will serve a primarily instrumentalist purpose. However, by 2002, even the state’s rationale for cultivating a Chinese elite is now given an instrumentalist slant. The state has promised the Chinese community that it will conduct yet another review of Chinese language education and here, the main objective is “to develop a bilingual Chinese elite that understands China’s culture, history and modern developments in politics, economics and business” in order to “ensure that Singapore maintains a linguistic edge over its economic rivals” (The Straits Times, 12 October 2002). Thus, even for the elite, there is an expectation that their knowledge be relevant to Singapore’s economic interests.

But not all Singaporeans are comfortable with this turn towards linguistic instrumentalism. Following the Prime Minister’s 2002 National Day Rally Speech, where the economic value of Mandarin was once again highlighted, members of the Chinese-speaking community “debated whether it was appropriate to use economic incentives to entice Singaporeans to pick up the language, instead of through cultural
persuasion” with some speakers asking what would happen to Mandarin should “China’s economy falter one day” (The Straits Times, 28 August 2002). One speaker was quoted as asking: “So if Russia’s economy were to rise up next, would we have to abandon Chinese and go learn Russian instead?”. Such unease shows that in the eyes of at least some Chinese Singaporeans, the discourse that highlights the linguistic instrumentalist value of Mandarin conflicts with the state’s earlier discourse where Mandarin is promoted as a symbolic marker of ethnic identity and cultural authenticity. Thus, while limiting Mandarin to a “conservative function” may result in a loss of status, the recent reactions to treating it in instrumentalist terms suggest some unhappiness with holding the fate of the language hostage to the vagaries of global economic competitiveness.

5. English-Mandarin bilingualism: From ethnic affiliation to socio-economic status

A number of scholars have been interested in the impact of globalization on language use. Cameron (2000), for example, examines the style of speech that workers in the U.K. service economy are required to adopt, and relates this to changes resulting from economic globalization. The papers in Cope & Kalantzis (2000), in attempting to understand the impact of global changes on literacy teaching, have developed a notion of ‘multiliteracies’, which situates cultural and linguistic diversity in the context of multi-modal channels of communication. Finally, of particular relevance to the argument being developed in this paper is Heller’s (1999a, 1999b, 2002) ethnographic study of changes in ideologies concerning the value of French. Heller (1999b: 336) notes that processes of globalization have led to:

(i) the commodification of language;
(ii) pressures towards standardization for international communication; and
(iii) the opposite, the valuing of local characteristics in order to legitimate local control over local markets, and in order to attach a value of distinction to linguistic commodities in world markets of culture and tourism.

Heller’s study, which focuses on a French-language minority school in Canada, suggests that any local French Canadian vernacular which is considered too far from the standard is being marginalized. Instead, a “new core standard, which allows for a certain amount of variation but not much” (1999b: 357) is emerging. These changes
have socio-economic correlates. Speakers of the vernacular –primarily members of the working class– are unlikely to have access to power in the market; rather the ones most able to take advantage of economic opportunities are “local elites, as long as they are well-connected to globalized economic activities” (ibid).

Heller’s findings cohere with the changes taking place in Singapore, at least as far as the state’s policies are concerned. The state’s Speak Good English Movement clearly attempts to resolve the tension between Singlish and a more standardized English in favor of the latter, the rationale being an appeal to the need to ensure global competitiveness. The co-existence of Singlish and standard English is deemed untenable because the presence of the former, the state believes, will only mean a deterioration of proficiency in the latter. And it is standard English, not Singlish, that is seen to have a linguistic instrumentalist value in the global economy.

Likewise, the changes to the teaching of Mandarin, while attempting to balance the conservative (symbolic) function with an economic (instrumentalist) one, suggest that only a small elite is truly expected to fully appreciate Chinese culture. And even here, the knowledge wielded by this elite is increasingly seen in terms of its potential economic benefits. There is in fact evidence that state’s increased emphasis on Mandarin’s linguistic instrumentalist value has already struck a chord with some members of the Chinese community (though obviously not all, as we saw above). For example, a Chinese-educated academic has been quoted as saying “Help us Chinese-educated learn the language well and do business in China. The money we bring back will benefit all Singaporeans. Trust us. We will not betray you.” (The Straits Times, 12 October 2002) And in a study of language use and attitudes amongst various Teochew families in Singapore, Wei et al. (1997) note a pattern of language shift from the Teochew dialect towards English-Mandarin bilingualism, motivated primarily by the desire of parents for their children to be socially and economically successful (1997: 379). They note that “high income families seldom use Teochew”, “(r)elatively low income families aspire to speak Mandarin and English instead of Teochew”, and that it is a “pragmatic attitude towards the instrumental value of English and Mandarin” that has resulted in “the lack of Teochew transmission” (1997: 382).

The upshot of all this is that we appear to have moved away somewhat from the original conception of what it means to be an English-Mandarin bilingual in Singapore. The original position, we recall, was that while English acted as the language of socio-
economic mobility, Mandarin, as the official mother tongue, acted as the cultural anchor that “inoculated” Chinese Singaporeans against the danger of becoming “deculturalized”. But the Singapore government’s attempts to respond to the pressure of global economic competition sees both English and Mandarin now associated with linguistic instrumentalism; English always so, but Mandarin increasingly as well. Whereas in the past only English was presented as having economic value, such that the Chinese-educated Singaporeans were resentful of the better job opportunities available to their English-educated counterparts (Hill & Lian, 1995: 71), current changes suggest that as both languages come to increasingly be seen to confer economic advantages on their speakers, English-Mandarin bilingualism will be treated more as a marker of socio-economic status than an indicator of cultural rootedness.

6. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to analyze the shift in Singapore’s language policy of English-knowing bilingualism from one where the mother tongue is primarily a repository of ancient cultural knowledge to one where it is valued for its economic/practical relevance. This shift is a strategic response by the state to the challenges of globalization, and in particular, it is motivated by the recognition that the ‘right’ linguistic repertoire can serve as an important economic resource. Doing this means emphasizing linguistic instrumentalism, and as we have seen, this is often at the expense of any symbolic value a language may possess. This gives rise of arenas of conflict as differing views about particular languages compete to be heard and to influence language policies. Both the claims by some Singaporeans that Singlish can act as a national identity marker, and the state’s own claims that Mandarin is a marker of ethnic Chinese identity, sit uneasily with its current attempts to promote English-Mandarin bilingualism as a means of ensuring global economic competitiveness. The emphasis on linguistic instrumentalism is a response to the challenges of globalization, but the consequent tensions that result as this response comes into contact with identity-oriented claims is one that the state has yet to successfully resolve.

8 In a racially and linguistically heterogeneous society such as Singapore, it is pertinent to ask what implications the shift towards linguistic instrumentalism in the case of Mandarin may have on the status of the other official mother tongues. This issue is discussed in Wee (2002).
I close by suggesting that the Singapore situation may be general enough to be applicable across a range of contexts where issues of language maintenance and language shift are being considered. Under pressures of globalization, a language policy has to choose between two major options. One, a specific language can be ‘cocooned’ from expectations that it have current relevance by arguing that it serves primarily a conservative function. This, as we have seen, was the initial strategy taken with regard to Mandarin in Singapore. The price to be paid for this move is that the language very quickly fails to attract sufficient speakers in the younger generations. Enforced learning of the language in the school system can only go so far since, in the wider community, decreased levels of usage are a real concern as speakers slowly shift to economically more advantageous languages. The second option, then, is to expose the language to the demands of globalization, and this means drawing attention to its instrumentalist value in providing its speakers with economic capital. In Singapore, the subtle changes made to the teaching of Mandarin suggests that for the majority, Mandarin is increasingly presented as a language of economic import. And even for the minority elite, their intimate knowledge of Mandarin is being justified on economic grounds. Such changes in what it means to be an English-Mandarin bilingual in Singapore suggest that the government has recognized the futility of language maintenance without linguistic instrumentalism.

Bibliographical references


