1. Language choice and code switching: Not as clear as it seems

Language choice and codeswitching are tightly interwoven. Whenever a speaker switches from Language A to Language B, she may be said to have chosen Language B at the switch-point. Similarly, when, for instance, two siblings talk about their plans for the weekend in Language A, but switch to Language B as soon as they start discussing their homework, they may be said to have codeswitched. Following Fishman (1971), we could argue that the social relationship between the speakers has changed: they started talking to each other as schoolmates rather than as siblings, and since the social situation they found themselves in had changed, they were forced to reconsider which would be the most appropriate language choice. In this sense, language choice is said to index the situation. Blom & Gumperz (1972) would argue that the switch to language B was an example of metaphorical codeswitching: the children prefer to speak the more formal “they-code”, the majority language, where school matters are concerned. By virtue of their association with particular domains of everyday life, the languages index this portion of the conversation as pertaining to that domain. Whether it’s called ‘codeswitching’ or ‘language choice’, indexicality seems to be what drives the distribution of languages.

One way in which terminological confusion can be avoided is to clearly define a boundary between two domains of application, both terms uniquely applying to only one of them. ‘Language choice’ could be limited to whole conversations, and ‘codeswitching’ for those cases where two (or more) languages are used within a
conversation. In addition to allowing the two monolingual options, one’s model of ‘language choice’ then has to allow for the choice of ‘both languages’ or ‘mixed speech’ for any given conversation, while one’s model of ‘codeswitching’ can deal with the actual patterns of alternation observable in such conversations.

Most authors agree, though, that in practice, the distinction is difficult to uphold, for at least the following two reasons. First, the same set of determinants governs both phenomena. Only as long as we limit ourselves to surveys, in which we ask bilinguals the abstract question which language they would use in such-and-such a context with such-and-such persons, the two domains are nicely demarcated. Second, as soon as we look at actual conversations, we will notice the use of both languages. Theoretically, each fragment of the conversation may be done completely in just one of the languages, in which case we can talk about the ‘language choice’ for each “conversation within a conversation”. This, however, requires solving the tricky technical problem of deciding where conversations begin and end. Did the two siblings in our hypothetical earlier example have one or two conversations? However, as we all know, actual bilingual conversations are not composed of neatly demarcated monolingual mini-conversations: they tend to move back and forth between the languages, with periods of dense codeswitching alternated with relatively monolingual portions (‘relatively’ being the operative word). Here, the domain of ‘language choice’ surely gives way to that of ‘codeswitching’. However, many switches seem to be made out of very conscious motivations, which makes them very similar to cases of conscious language choice. A cut-off point, however, seems hard to make, and is perhaps not needed anyway. Gardner-Chloros (1991: 36) refers to this overlap between language choice and codeswitching:

Language selection (or language choice – the two terms are here used interchangeably) will be dealt with briefly: whilst it is conceptually inseparable from code-switching-since switching represents changes in the choices which are made or, in some circumstances, a ‘third choice’ […].

This paper will focus on these two problems. First, we will look at the factors that govern both language choice and codeswitching; subsequently, we will present some of our work on the operation of these factors in bilingual Turkish-Dutch conversations.
2. Determining factors of language choice and codeswitching

One reason for the conceptual overlap between language choice and codeswitching is the fact that the same factors seem to govern the two phenomena. This is shown, for example, in Grosjean (1982: 136, 152), who, without commenting on this himself, gives largely overlapping sets of factors accounting for language choice and for codeswitching. Under the heading ‘Factors influencing language choice’, he mentions, among other things: *power relation, to raise status, type of vocabulary, and to exclude someone*. It is striking how these factors match (and in some cases even are literally the same) with four of his ‘Reasons for code-switching’, such as *add authority, raise status, fill a linguistic need for lexical item, set phrase, discourse marker, or sentence filler and exclude someone from conversation*.

This, incidentally, provides another explanation for the tendency to ascribe a conscious motivation to individual cases of codeswitching. If the factors governing language choice and codeswitching are the same, and ‘language choice’ implies conscious decisions on the part of the speaker, ‘codeswitching’ must also be done consciously, i.e. the term may be taken literally, as representing a psycholinguistically real switch to the other language system. That, however, is patently false in many cases, in particular in what has come to be known as ‘insertional codeswitching’, or, better, simply ‘insertion’, in which the speaker just inserts a word from the other language in a matrix language clause. The motivation for insertion is generally semantic, prompted by the need to refer to a concept that is best expressed by a ‘foreign’ word, and has little to do with language choice.

3. Functions of codeswitching, with illustrations from Immigrant Turkish

In this section we will illustrate how indexicality sometimes provokes a switch in our data, and at other times seems to have nothing to do with it. As Table 1 illustrates, indexicality (a subtype of ‘pragmatic function’) is first and foremost associated with one type of codeswitching only, the alternational kind.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Switched element</th>
<th>Insertion</th>
<th>Alternation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominant reason</td>
<td>Established word</td>
<td>Novel clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resulting structure</td>
<td>Semantic need</td>
<td>Pragmatic function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monolingual (matrix language)</td>
<td>Bilingual (switch)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Prototypical characteristics of insertional and alternational codeswitching.
Before going into specific examples, we will briefly introduce our data in Section 3.1.

3.1. Data

We make use of two different data sets, both collected in the Turkish immigrant community in Holland. Eversteijn’s data were gathered among 50 Turkish teenagers who were born in the Netherlands or arrived there before the age of four. In a survey, they were asked various questions about their sociobiographic background, language dominance and cultural orientation, and then asked to complete an extensive language choice questionnaire. On a seven point scale of language modes varying from ‘only Turkish’ to ‘only Dutch’, they were asked to indicate which mode they spoke in everyday life with a number of different interlocutors in several settings. Whenever they reported to use more than one language, they were asked at what moments, and for what reasons they applied codeswitching. These self-reported data were then supplemented by recordings of spontaneous conversation within the social network of four of the teenagers. Of these, two had indicated that they used relatively much Turkish in everyday life, while the other two reported relatively extensive use of Dutch (see also Eversteijn, 2001).

Backus’ data are older and consist of various recordings of spontaneous bilingual speech (see Backus, 1996). Informants, mostly in their twenties, are from various generations, ranging from recent immigrants to members of the second generation. In general, across the generations, language use shifts from predominantly Turkish to predominantly Dutch, with a concomitant shift in preferred type of codeswitching from insertion to alternation. The data we will make use of in this paper are mainly from the second generation.

3.2. Turkish-Dutch examples

Insertions are not expected to index the communicative situation in any way, mainly because we tacitly assume that utterances can do this job but not single words. It is hard to see, for instance, the Turkish word *akşam* ‘evening’ in (1a) as indexing ‘Turkish culture’.

However, taking the term ‘codeswitching’ literally is not always wrong, even with insertion. There ARE many cases of insertion which ARE done for a, perhaps
conscious, pragmatic reason, for example the use of English higher register terms in Swahili (Myers-Scotton, 1993; Kamwangamalu, 1989) to invoke a ‘modern’ image. The mirror image of this, the avoidance of such words for purist reasons, is equally revealing (see the fate of Spanish words in Mexicano (Hill & Hill, 1986) or Rapanui (Makihari, 2001).

1a. wat ga je *aşam* doen?
   “what are you doing *tonight*?”

1b. hier ben je ook geen Nederlander, je bent gewoon *karışık*
   “here, you’re not Dutch either, you’re just mixed”

As Example (1b) shows, an insertion can perfectly well be motivated referentially (i.e. semantically) AND by indexicality (i.e. pragmatically) at the same time. When a Turkish speaker in Holland talks about the specific problems facing the second generation, her choice of Turkish terms in Dutch discourse, such as the term *karışık* for the peculiar sensation of being part of two cultures, but not quite accepted by either one, fulfills both roles at the same time: it denotes concepts not available in Dutch, at least not with the same connotation, and it lends a Turkish flavor to the conversation. The difference between semantic and pragmatic (or communicative) motivation is certainly a valid one, but they should not be seen as completely independent of each other, since the meaning of any linguistic element is partly semantic and partly pragmatic (Langacker, 1998: 4).

The insertion data force the conclusion that we cannot simply say that, of the two types of CS, only alternation can exploit the indexicality potential, though it may be much more typical for alternation. The occurrence of alternational CS at particular points in discourse is often explained with reference to ‘global’ (or ‘macro-’) factors, such as ‘participants’, ‘discourse type’, ‘topic’ and ‘setting’ (what Gumperz, 1982, called *situational codeswitching*). Global factors are generally assumed to trigger language choice or *situational codeswitching*, but note that it is hard to see where the dividing line is between this and Gumperz’ (1982) category of ‘addressee specification’, which belongs to the other major category of switches: *metaphorical codeswitching*, a category supposed to be furthest removed from language choice. The root of the problem is, of course, that the factor ‘participants’ can be of importance on the macro level as well as on the micro level of a conversation, as McClure (1981: 74) observed:
Among the children we studied, it appears that the earliest systematic codeswitching is a function of the category *participants* (original stress). Such switching occurs not only at junctures between conversations but also between and within turns of speaking.

While ‘participants’ is typically a ‘macro’ factor, it may trigger temporary codeswitching as well. To take a less ‘global’ factor, ‘topic’ probably cannot determine the language of an entire exchange. As a determining factor, it is more likely to bring about shifts in the relative contributions the two languages make, by triggering the use of certain terms from only one of the languages and perhaps more elaborate switches. McClure (1981: 85) confirms this as well “topic is a situational factor affecting code selection, but it does not alone determine it. Consequently, codeswitching may be used stylistically to mark a desired change in topic”.

In order to maintain as much as possible of the intuitively useful distinction between language choice and codeswitching, we may wish to recategorize the determining factors as either *predominantly* operating on ‘language choice’ or *predominantly* on ‘codeswitching’, depending on how lasting or ephemeral they are.

However, even this cannot be upheld categorically. The following example (2) from Eversteijn’s unpublished data illustrate that even the factor ‘speaker’s language proficiency’, which one is inclined to interpret as almost prototypically a macro level factor, thus associated with language choice, can play a role on the micro-level too, i.e. bring about a single codeswitch in an ongoing conversation.

The main informant is Selim, a fifteen-year old boy, who plays soccer at a high level and therefore has to go to soccer practice almost every weekday. Selim is strongly dominant in Dutch, as a matter of fact, he reports he is not even able to talk in monolingual Turkish. Other participants are Selim’s mother, research assistant Deniz and his girlfriend Merve. Selim’s mother and Deniz both speak Dutch fluently, but are dominant in Turkish. Merve was born in the Netherlands and can be considered a balanced bilingual.

2. Deniz: Bugün müsadece boş? “Is today the only day off?”
Mother: Sadece salı günleri boş. “Only Tuesdays are off.”
Deniz: Diğer günler hep antreman. “All the other days (there is) training.”
Deniz: Üç tane çok ya. “Three times, that is really a lot.”
In the first utterance in bold, Selim tries to say that he will be bored by extra mathematic lessons in the evening. However, he seems to have some problems with expressing this quickly in Turkish (observe his struggle with the case endings). He solves his momentary problem by totally rephrasing his intention, and by switching to Dutch, which is his dominant language.

In Selim’s example, the case for a rational decision may be plausibly made; in such cases, CS and choice are both appropriate terms, unless the domain of application for ‘choice’ is a priori limited to entire conversations.

At other times, we find instances of alternational codeswitching that seem entirely without pragmatic motivation; it is, for instance, hard to think of a reason why the mother and son chose the languages they chose in the various turns in (3). It is such seemingly unmotivated CS that has led researchers to posit a third system, a mixture of A and B that has, to a certain extent, been conventionalized to a variety in its own right.
Selim: Ja.
“Yes.”
Selim: Gelir işte iki hafta sonra.
“They will just come in two weeks.”

We will return to the issue of a ‘third variety’ in Section 6. In this section we have seen that, though we can generally say that language choice is a macro-phenomenon and codeswitching a micro-one, maintaining a neat distinction between the two is hard to do. It’s governed by very much the same set of background factors, making these unreliable as diagnostics. To be sure, some are typically associated with language choice and others typically with codeswitching, but none do so exclusively. There simply is much overlap between the sets of factors that influence choice of language and those that bring about CS. The underlying reason for this overlap is probably that indexicality plays a crucial role in both codeswitching and language choice, though in slightly different ways. In language choice, there is not much room for marked choices, the determinants being pretty forceful in singling out the language that is appropriate for the occasion. If one of the participants doesn’t speak Language A, that language would not be a likely choice for the conversation. A marked language choice would certainly index something, but it comes at a high social price, so it doesn’t occur very often. On the other hand, if all members of, say, a Turkish student union in Holland, are bilingual, and they yet decide that all official meetings have to be in Turkish only, that choice serves to index their Turkish identity. This same type of indexicality lies at the heart of much codeswitching; however, here indexicality is exploited much less systematically. There is much more room for exploration, too, since a switch that doesn’t ‘feel right’ or risks insulting the interlocutor, can always be undone by switching back. The questions that remain are a) what percentage of individual switches have a pragmatic motivation?; and b) how often is an apparent possibility to switch with an indexicality-related motivation actually seized upon? The rest of the paper looks at these empirical points. We will discuss some data to show the extents to which particular motivations generally described as governing codeswitching, actually are seen to do so.
4. The six functions of language: Towards a coding scheme for utterance function

Appel & Muysken (1987) also acknowledge that language choice and code switching are not clearly distinguishable. They apply the six functions of language systems distinguished by Mühlhäusler (1981: 81) (which is itself based on earlier work by Jakobson and Halliday) to language choice, and than state: “quite obviously the same model that could potentially account for the choice of a given language could be used to explain the switching between languages”.

The six functions involved are: the referential function, the directive function, the expressive function, the phatic function, the metalinguistic function and the poetic function. Applied to language mixing, this model has great potential if its six functions are considered as main categories. That is to say: almost all factors influencing language choice and/or codeswitching which are mentioned in the literature, the additional factors we encountered when conducting conversational analysis on some of our data, and the answers to questions about motivations for language choice given by the Turkish-Dutch informants in Eversteijn’s on-going research, can be placed, rather easily, under one of the six headings. Only the category ‘metalinguistic’ had to be extended a little, so as to include general language skills of the speakers. As an example, the subcategories which were assigned to the category of ‘directive factors’ are shown below.

Inclusion

1) Wish to accommodate to interlocutor
   (a) By using the only language shared with this person
   (b) By using his/her dominant language
   (c) By using his/her preferred language

2) Wish not to exclude bystanders
   (a) By using the only language shared with these persons
   (b) By using their dominant language

3) Translate and explain

Exclusion

4) Rebellion
   (a) Uttered by using unknown language interlocutor
   (b) Uttered by using non-dominant language interlocutor

5) Secrets
(a) Told in unknown language bystander(s)
(b) Told in non-dominant language bystander(s)
6) Politeness/wish not to bother someone
   (a) Uttered by using unknown language interlocutor
   (b) Uttered by using non-dominant language interlocutor
7) Respect/social distance (age and socioeconomic status interlocutor)
8) Sex of interlocutor
9) History of linguistic interaction with interlocutor
10) Exploring interlocutor’s language skills, dominance and preference
11) Accommodation to previous turn interlocutor

Of course, if it turns out that every conceivable category is sometimes instantiated by a codeswitch, then we have only proved that codeswitching is nothing special, since the reason linguists have uncovered these functions is because they occur in monolingual language use. What we expect to find is a preponderance of codeswitches with certain categories only.

**4.1. Factors influencing language choice and code-switching**

One of the criticisms often leveled at the sociolinguistic studies of codeswitching is that they merely provide an unordered list of functions CS is shown to fulfill in bilingual interactions (see Myers-Scotton, 1993). The list is open-ended, and there is no structure to it. Both points are typical of a field in development: the list has to be open-ended until we can be reasonably sure, in the name of descriptive adequacy, that we have uncovered all or most of the functions that theoretically can be fulfilled by CS, or by any utterance, for that matter. Structure can be imposed once a certain critical mass has been established. We feel enough headway has been made to impose some sort of structure on a list that we don’t pretend is complete, but which we do think is not all that incomplete anymore, either. The result is a structured inventory, which we have used as our coding scheme for coding the pragmatic functions of every single utterance in a portion of our data. We are, of course, not the first to try to impose structure on the inventory of functions; ours differs from the efforts of, for example, Myers-Scotton (1993) and Auer (1998), in that we are less theoretically ambitious at this point, and work at a lower level of abstraction.

It will not come as a surprise that, in many cases, a single utterance manifests several factors. Therefore, if a clause happens to be a case of CS, it is often not just one
factor that determines the selection of the code for a particular utterance. On the contrary, several factors can operate in conjunction, and reinforce each other in their effects on code choice. Some factors will always be accompanied by other factors, by definition perhaps. ‘Reiteration’ (a phatic factor), for instance, will always be accompanied by something, since people generally don’t repeat something for the sake of repeating it, unless their interlocutor didn’t hear it. Factors that belong to different main categories will combine naturally. ‘Accommodation to the previous turn of the interlocutor’ (a directive factor) does not say anything about the content of what is being said, so some other factor, which describes the intent of the utterance, will be needed as well.

Of course, factors don’t always conspire; some will even be mutually exclusive, such as ‘disagreement’ and ‘acceptance’ (both phatic factors). Others will not co-occur because they are different points on a continuum, such as ‘Topic change’ and ‘elaboration’ (phatic factors as well). In such cases, it may be difficult to establish a cut-off point between them. In their influence on language choice, contradictory factors may compete with each other. For example, regarding the ‘speaker’s own language dominance’ (a factor concerning general language skills) code A could be the most appropriate choice, while at the same time the ‘interlocutor’s language dominance’ (a directive factor) could make code B the best alternative. Similarly, while the age of an interlocutor could call for the minority language code A because it is most suitable for ‘expressing respect’ (a directive factor), the annoyance of the speaker at a certain point in the conversation could make him want to ‘express rebellion’ (another directive factor), which is often done in the majority language code B, especially by young people. At such moments, the speaker has to deliberate which factor is most important at that very moment. Grosjean (1981: 143) calls this the ‘weighting of factors’:

Rarely does a single factor account for a bilingual’s choice of one language over another. [...] Usually some factors are more important –have more weight– than others and thus play a greater role when combined with other factors.

What we have called phatic factors, i.e. factors which concern the structuring of a conversation, the tone of a conversation or the instantiation of a certain speech act, have always garnered most of the attention in the CS literature. While most of them have been shown to trigger CS at one point or another, they are usually not strongly associated with one particular language (although some of them may be, e.g.
personalizing, which is usually done through the minority language, or rebellion, which is usually associated with the majority language; these are the sorts of functions which typically figure in discussions of ‘we’ and ‘they’ codes). This may be a contributing factor to an important finding in the more recent literature on alternational CS. Many times, more so in some communities than in others, it is the signaling function of the contrast between two codes, which is exploited, rather than the direction of the switch (Alfonzetti, 1998).

Of all the factors, it’s the directive ones that are most often mentioned in our language choice questionnaires. This is interesting because analyses of the communicative functions of codeswitching in bilingual transcripts rarely mention these factors (concentrating on phatic ones instead). One could imagine that directive factors are not important in conversations between close friends, but our data show otherwise.

5. Some preliminary quantitative analysis

In this paper, we add one twist to the general practice in research on this topic. It is not only interesting to know when switches are made, but also when they are not made. Gardner-Chloros et al. (2000) show that switches are used sometimes for marking quotes and asides, as has been demonstrated by many before her, but she also shows that at other points in the same conversation quotes and asides are not accompanied by a switch. We cannot discover how codeswitching is exploited in structuring a conversation when we only look at the points where switches are actually made; this is the reason why we found it necessary to ascribe a factor to every utterance, not just to the utterances that contain or instantiate codeswitching.

Before going into some results, we wish to make two methodological points. While we see the application of the above coding scheme as ‘mere’ coding, it is far from obvious whether enough of a consensus can be reached in the coding of any individual clause. Coding for discourse status is certainly less straightforward than coding morphosyntactic categories or parts of speech. That means we need to, ideally, have various raters code the same stretch of discourse, which, of course, is very costly. Still, every effort needs to be made in this respect until we have a coding manual that can be used with just a little training. Second, many of the categories require the rater to straddle the border between coding and analysis. That is, interpreting a certain utterance
as, say, an instance of evaluation, requires conversational analysis of the immediately preceding discourse. However, this need threatens the very project we are undertaking because it would require too much time. We are, therefore, looking for a way to incorporate as little conversational analysis as we can get away with in our coding scheme, while at the same time acknowledging that SOME conversational analysis on the part of the rater is unavoidable (cf. Coupland, 2001: 208).

The second point relates to the level of compatibility between conversational analysis and preconceived classification. It may be objected that it is impossible to have a classification scheme that will cover each and every nuance of pragmatics that a conversational analysis of a fragment will illuminate. Pragmatics, that is, must make use of an open-ended list of possible functions utterances can have, in contrast to, for instance, morphosyntax, for which we can draw up a pretty complete inventory. In our view, this is at once true and unproblematic. We see the relationship between the two, classification and analysis, as one of coarse sorting and subsequent fine-grained sifting. Only conversational analysis can point out the various uses and sub-types of, for instance, elaboration, but it would certainly help if there is a coding system in place that identifies every point in the conversation to be analyzed where some type of elaboration takes place. Certainly, it is possible, even likely, that our classification scheme leaves out functions we were not aware of, and/or lumps categories into one factor that shouldn’t be lumped. However, we are optimistic that with growing experience, the list will approach completion more and more. In addition, spot checks can be conducted, in which various raters code the same fragment. Such experiments will be very helpful in identifying problematic and unproblematic categories, and allow the description of prototypical and non-prototypical cases of each category, which, in turn, should have real theoretical benefits. Even in the worst-case scenario, if no consensus can be reached in the majority of cases, the finding would be an important one for linguistics as a whole, because it would point to a paradox: that we generally think we understand what someone “is doing” with her utterance, while different people have as many different interpretations of what it is they think “she’s doing”. Though we don’t expect such extreme vagueness, our enterprise should at least allow us to uncover how much of this type of vagueness goes on in daily interaction.
In future work, we intend to look at a few often-noted functions of code-switching, and examine how often these occur in total in our conversations and how often they were indeed accompanied by a switch. In doing so, we will also investigate whether these functions tend to cluster with certain other functions, in the sense that utterances with pragmatic function ‘A’ will often also encode pragmatic function ‘B’. Here, we present the results of a modest pilot study, in which we coded the first 80 turns of one of the bilingual conversations in Backus’ corpus (see Backus, 1996, for details). The selected conversation involves three second generation women in their early twenties, who alternate between Dutch and Turkish continuously, mostly at clause, sentence or turn boundaries, while talking about the cultural differences between Turkey and the immigrant community in Holland. We have looked in some more detail at the four functions of codeswitching studied by Gardner-Chloros et al. (2000). It was counted how often the discourse markers ‘ama’ and ‘maar’ (meaning ‘but’ in Turkish and Dutch respectively), asides, quotations and reiterations occurred in the first 80 turns of Backus’ transcript. Subsequently, it was listed how often these phenomena were accompanied by a switch. The results are given in Table 2. Note that there were no utterances in this part of the conversation that could be coded as an aside.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Total number found</th>
<th>N accompanied by switch</th>
<th>% accompanied by switch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse marker</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ama/maar (“but”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asides</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reiterations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Total number of discourse markers ama/maar, asides, quotations and reiterations found and number of them accompanied by a switch, in absolute numbers and percentages.

**Discourse markers**

Though the numbers are obviously too small to mean very much, it is noticeable how often there is a switch surrounding an adversative conjunction/discourse marker. Of its 11 occurrences in these 80 turns, 5 times ama/maar was the first word of an alternational switch (as in (4a), and in one case ‘maar’ was an insertional switch by itself, as in (4b). These figures confirm what others have found regarding these conjunctions: presumably because of their salience in indicating contrast, they are easily taken from the other language in cases of language contact.
4a. Meryem: *Nee, niet zo, ama... ızıcık, ızıcık değişik.*
“No, not like that, but... a little, a little different.”
4b. Türk, buradaki gençler daha halen öyle diyor.
“That Turks, young Turks here and now are like that, she says.”
*Maar şimdi orada...*
“But now there...”

*Quotation*

Ex. (5) contains both an example of a quotation not accompanied by a switch (*başımı ört*) and one that is a switch (*ayıp olur*):

5. Mesela birisi bir büyük bir adam geliyor, diyorlar: *başını ört!* Niye? *Ja,*
ayıp olur, *en zo!*
“For example some big shot comes, and they say: cover your head! Why?
Yeah, it’s a shame, and all that!”

*Repetition*

Repetition is conversationally redundant, so it must serve some other function (Wray, 2002: 88). The reiterations found coincided with the functions clarification, acceptance, suggesting, mitigating, concluding, challenging and strengthening.

Three reiterations which were accompanied by a switch were cases of self-repetition, the other one, given in (6), was a case of other-repetition.

“It’s just not one person, everybody does.”
*Selma:* *Ja, iedereen.*
“Yes, everybody.”

The number of times a repetition is done through codeswitching seems low, considering it is one of the functions consistently reported to be common for switches. On the other hand, we have no idea whether 27% really does constitute a low percentage or not. It is entirely possible that, in most bilingual corpora, this is close to the average or even much higher than the average. In studies of CS, analysts have identified the instances of CS and subsequently analyzed their communicative functions. That has given us a list of functions carried out by CS and a rough idea of which ones are the most common, but not a reliable indication of how likely a given function is carried out by a switch in language. Our analysis aims to fill this gap in the methodology.
6. Discussion

The main problem for demarcating language choice and codeswitching seems to be that, on the assumption that language choice always involves a rational decision by a speaker, on the basis of conscious motivations, codeswitching sometimes IS language choice (i.e. a conscious decision), while at other times speakers seem to have produced it more or less without thinking. That is, it may be justified to define language choice as what speakers do when deciding in which language to conduct a conversation and codeswitching as alternating between languages within a conversation, but we need to be aware of two things: 1) there are ‘conversations within conversations’, for which a language may be chosen, creating another definition problem: what counts as a ‘conversation’?; and 2) as Grosjean’s tables illustrate, the same factors do indeed bring about both phenomena, though some factors are more typically associated with language choice and others with codeswitching.

In Section 5, we looked at various instances of CS as self-contained entities. However, if we change our perspective from individual cases of switching to the way of speaking as a whole, we are forced to see codeswitching itself as a ‘language mode’, i.e. a variety. Since varieties are reified ways of speaking, and can thus be ‘chosen’ by speakers, we are forced to say that one language choice speakers may make is ‘the mixed variety’. In fact, it is even more complex than this, as any glance at a bilingual transcript will reveal, because this ‘mixed variety’ itself is not homogenous. It’s almost never a neat system of, for instance, only Matrix Language clauses with Embedded Language content words, or regular alternation of sentences in Languages A and B. Instead, what are normally encountered, are conversations that move back and forth between the languages, with sometimes A dominating, and sometimes B, with sometimes dense insertion and at other times virtually monolingual stretches in B. This is what Meeuwis & Blommaert (1998) refer to as ‘layered codeswitching’, in which the switch is between two varieties that are themselves ‘mixed’.

We can speak of such a ‘third choice’ (not ‘A’, not ‘B’, but ‘C’, in which ‘C’ may be a new variety or an ad-hoc combination of ‘A’ and ‘B’), when the conversation only seems to contain two different linguistic systems from the linguist’s point of view, i.e. to be full of alternational codeswitching, while the speakers themselves clearly do not perceive themselves to be switching between two varieties and, perhaps more
important for us linguists, do not appeal to the languages’ potential for indexicality. An
early expression of this methodological principle can be found in Gardner-Chloros

It is time to concentrate on the distinctions in language behaviour which are
organising principles for speakers, leaving to last any positive linguistic categorisation
of the units or varieties involved.

We have little doubt that this view is correct. No doubt many cases of language
mixture have erroneously been ascribed to actual conscious switching from one
linguistic system to another in the mind of the speaker. The fact that ‘codeswitching’ is
a misnomer for many of the cases we all hold to be prototypical instances of it, i.e. cases
of insertion, may stand as a reminder. However, it is not so easy to find convincing
evidence against this interpretation of ‘conscious motivation’ for cases of alternational
CS. The most successful criterion uncovered so far in the Conversational Analysis
literature, to our minds, is the identification of switches that are not exploited to mark
any recognizable function in discourse.

On the other hand, as we have shown, pragmatic motivations for CAN be found
for any utterance, if only because EVERY utterance has a pragmatic function. The
challenge, to our minds, is not just to find the functions carried out by individual
switches, but also to establish which functions, out of a preferably exhaustive set of
pragmatic functions, are served by CS more often, relatively speaking, than others. We
may add at this point that, so far, no functions have been uncovered that are uniquely
served by CS, not even functions that are considered typical for switches, such as
quotations and parenthetical remarks.

Bibliographical references


